Choices, Values and Frames Ed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky

1. Choices, values, and frames
Part I. Prospect Theory and Extensions:
2. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk
3. Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
Part II. The Certainty Effect and the Weighting Function:
4. Compound invariant weighting function in prospect theory
5. Weighing risk and uncertainty
6. A belief-based account of decision under uncertainty
Part III. Loss Aversion and the Value Function:
7. Loss aversion in riskless choice: a reference-dependent model
8. Anomalies: the endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias
9. The endowment effect and evidence of nonreversible indifference curves
10. A test of the theory of reference-dependent preferences
Part IV. Framing and Mental Accounting:
11. Rational choice and the framing of decisions
12. Framing, probability distortions, and insurance decisions
13. Mental accounting matters
Part V. Applications:
14. Toward a positive theory of consumer choice
15. Prospect theory in the wild: evidence from the field
16. Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle
17. Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: entitlements in the market
18. Money illusion
19. Labor supply of New York City cab drivers: one day at a time
20. Are investors reluctant to realize their losses?
21. Timid choices and bold forecasts: a cognitive perspective on risk taking
22. Overconfidence and excess entry: an experimental approach
23. Judicial choice and disparities between measures of economic values
24. Contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice
25. Conflict resolution: a cognitive perspective
Part VI. The Multiplicity of Value: Reversals of Preference:
26. The construction of preference
27. Contingent weighting in judgment and choice
28. Context-dependent preferences
29. Ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance
30. The evaluability hypothesis: explaining joint-separate preference reversals and beyond
Part VII. Choice over Time:
31. Preferences for sequences of outcomes
32. Anomalies in intertemporal choice: evidence and an interpretation
Part VIII. Alternative Conceptions of Value:
33. Reason-based choice
34. Value elicitation: is there anything in there?
35. Economists have preferences, psychologists have attitudes: an analysis of dollar responses to public issues
Part IX. Experienced Utility:
36. Endowments and contrast in judgments of well-being
37. A bias in the prediction of tastes
38. The effect of purchase quantity and timing on variety-seeking behavior
39. Back to Bentham? Explorations of expereiences utility
40. New challenges to the rationality assumption.