TY  - BOOK
AU  - Congleton, Roger D.
AU  - Grofman, Bernard
AU  - Voigt, Stefan
TI  - The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice: Volume 2
SN  - 9780190469771
U1  - 302.13 
PY  - 2019///
CY  - New York
PB  - Oxford University Press
KW  - Social choice
N1  - PART V: Constitutional Political Economy
A. On the Architecture of Governance
1. How Should Votes be Cast and Counted?
2. Voters and representatives: How should representatives be selected?
3. Divided Government: the king and the council
4. Bicameralism
5. Federalism
6. Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design
7. Politics and the Legal System
8. Constitutional Review
9. Institutions for Amending Constitutions
10. Constitutional Transition
11. Electoral systems in the making
12. Choosing Voting Rules in the European Union
B. The Theory of Dictatorship
13. Leviathan, Taxation, and Public Goods
14. Fiscal Powers Revisited: The Leviathan Model after 40 Years
15. Are There Types of Dictatorship?
16. Are there really dictatorships? The Selectorate and authoritarian governance
17. The coup: competition for office in authoritarian regimes
18. The Logic of Revolutions: Rational Choice Perspectives
C. On the Effects of the Institutions of Governance
19. Direct Democracy and Public Policy
20. Policy differences among parliamentary and presidential systems
21. The Significance of Political Parties
Michael Munger
22. The least dangerous branch? Public choice, constitutional courts, and democratic governance
23. Challenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public Policy
PART VI: APPLICATIONS, EXTENSIONS, AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
24. The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution
25. The politics of central bank independence
26. The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy
27. Political Participation and the welfare
28. Institutions for Solving Commons Problems: Lessons and Implications for Institutional Design
29. Rational Ignorance and Public Choice
30. Is Government Growth Inevitable?
B. International Public Choice
31. The Political Economy of International Organizations
32. The Politics of International Trade
33. Politics, Direct Investment, Public Debt Markets and the Shadow Economy: What do we (not) know?
34. The Politics of International Aid
35. Is democracy exportable?
C. Public Choice and History
36. Ancient Greece: Democracy and Autocracy
37. Christian History and Public Choice
38. Voting at the U.S. Constitutional Convention
39. Precursors to public choice
40. Estimates of the Spatial Voting Model
41. The Dimensionality of Parliamentary Voting
42. Voting and Popularity
43. Detection of election fraud
44. Experimental Public Choice: Elections
45. Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting
ER  -