TY  - BOOK
AU  - Vulkan, Nir
AU  - Roth, Alvin E.
AU  - Neeman, Zvika
TI  - The Handbook of Market Design
SN  - 9780199570515
U1  - 338.501 
PY  - 2013///
CY  - Oxford
PB  - Oxford University Press
KW  - Game Theory
KW  - Markets - Mathematical Models
KW  - Statistical Matching
KW  - Supply and Demand
N1  - Part I GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. What Have We Learned From Market Design? / Alvin E. Roth
2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior / Gary E. Bolton
3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory / Paul Klemperer

Part II CASES
Section II. A Matching Markets
4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange / M. Utku Unver
5. School Choice / Atila Abddlkadiroolu
6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice / Haluk Ergin
7. Can the Job Market for Economists Be Improved? / John Watson
8. Designing Markets for Ideas / Scott Stern
9. Redesigning Microcredit / Tomas Sostrom

Section II. B Auctions
10. The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods / Paul Klemperer
11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions / Paul Milgrom
12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati Diamonds / Robert Wilson

Section II. C E-Commerce
13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior / Alvin E. Roth
14. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents / Nir Vulkan
15. The Design of Online Advertising Markets / Benjamin Edelman
16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting  0 Billion of Sourcing / Tuomas Sandholm
17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwidth / Chris Preist

Section II. D Law Design
18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems / Zviica Neeman
19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences / Eric Talley

Part III EXPERIMENTS
20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled-Assets Reverse Auction / Andrew Stocking
21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment / Uri Gneezy
22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions / Elena Katok
23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill / Hadas Y-Ape

Part IV COMPETING DESIGNS
24. Competing Mechanisms / Michael Peters
25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets / Zvika Neeman
ER  -