The Handbook of Market Design

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: Oxford Oxford University Press 2013Description: 681pISBN:

9780199570515

Subject(s):

DDC classification:

VUL 338.501

List(s) this item appears in: Tom Peters

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Item location	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Reference Book	NIMA Knowledge Centre	7th Floor Silence Zone	Reference	338.501 VUL (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan		M0029452

Total holds: 0

Part I GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. What Have We Learned From Market Design? / Alvin E. Roth
2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior / Gary E. Bolton
3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory / Paul Klemperer

Part II CASES
Section II. A Matching Markets
4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange / M. Utku Unver
5. School Choice / Atila Abddlkadiroolu
6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice / Haluk Ergin
7. Can the Job Market for Economists Be Improved? / John Watson
8. Designing Markets for Ideas / Scott Stern
9. Redesigning Microcredit / Tomas Sostrom

Section II. B Auctions
10. The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods / Paul Klemperer
11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions / Paul Milgrom
12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati Diamonds / Robert Wilson

Section II. C E-Commerce
13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior / Alvin E. Roth
14. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents / Nir Vulkan
15. The Design of Online Advertising Markets / Benjamin Edelman
16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 0 Billion of Sourcing / Tuomas Sandholm
17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwidth / Chris Preist

Section II. D Law Design
18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems / Zviica Neeman
19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences / Eric Talley

Part III EXPERIMENTS
20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled-Assets Reverse Auction / Andrew Stocking
21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment / Uri Gneezy
22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions / Elena Katok
23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill / Hadas Y-Ape

Part IV COMPETING DESIGNS
24. Competing Mechanisms / Michael Peters
25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets / Zvika Neeman

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